Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Defending Euthyphro

I wrote a paper on this subject a couple of years ago in philosophy and thought it might be a good idea to share now. Take a look.

This paper refers to two documents, the Euthyphro by Plato, and Is There Such a Thing as the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical By Kierkegaard.

Euthyphro: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html
Kierkegaard: I wish I could find the text, but I can't. Sorry.

In Plato’s Euthyphro, Euthyphro finds himself in a discussion with Socrates about the nature of what is holy. The primary question Socratese asks Euthypro is “Is a thing holy because it is loved by the gods or is it loved by the gods because it is holy?” My attempt in defending Euthyphro’s argument is not to defend Euthyphro, for Euthyphro argues in a circle and answers the above question with both alternatives. Furthermore, Socrates forces Euthyphro into several contradictions of himself. I cannot defend a contradiction, and since that is what made up Euthyphro’s argument, I cannot defend the argument. Rather, my aim is to show that answering Socrates question does not force a contradiction.

First, I must say that I am arguing from a slightly different standpoint than is Euthyphro. Euthyphro’s argument suffered a weakness because it was imbedded in polytheism, and the Greek gods were inconsistent in what they valued. A monotheistic system of beliefs avoids this weakness, and Socrates moves on from this criticism later in his question of Euthyphro, so inconsistencies in the deities will not be considered here, because the problem is irrelevant to monotheism. I will also use the term God throughout the paper rather than “the gods” of whom Socrates and Euthyphro speak.

The question still must be answered. Is a thing holy because God loves it, or does God love it because it is holy? My answer, is that a thing is holy because God loves it. Unfortunately, Socrates never really replied to Euthyphro on this point, because after Euthyphro said this, he realized that he had contradicted himself, and ran away. The only challenge of this position that is made in any of the texts for the semester is by Kierkegaard, and his criticism only applies to ethical situations, which will be discussed later.

The most apparent problem with this answer that I have suggested is what if God said something horrible like torturing babies is holy? If God is the standard, then anything God says goes, so he (I am using the male pronoun only for simplicity) technically has the authority to consider torturing babies as holy. If God wanted to, he could have created the universe in such a way that anything that is considered abominable could be virtuous.

However, assuming an omnipotent, omniscient, self-existing, creator God, access to understanding what he finds holy or good can be found it what he created and how he created it. The very notion that some things in this world seem to be absolute, such as torturing babies is wrong, shows that a creator God created the world in such a way where torturing babies is wrong. If God is as described above, he must be the foundation for all existence. He is self-existent, the universe is not, and he existed before the universe. He also created it and gave it the attributes that he chose. So, to speak of any attribute as having apparent value apart from how God views it or accepts it is utter nonsense. What can exist inside a universe that God created that is other than what God created? If this God exists, it seems to be logically necessary that all of the definitions for goodness and holiness be found in him.

It is here that Kierkegaard errs as well. The key premise of Kierkegaard’s argument condemning Abraham is not applicable in a world with an omniscient, omnipotent, self-existing, creator God. The first seven words in Kierkegaard’s “Is There Such a Thing as the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical” are “The ethical as such is the universal.” If God exists, God is the universal, not the ethical. The ethical certainly is experienced by everyone, but the ethical is and must be derived from God. Kierkegaard’s entire argument hinges on this premise. If he had stated that because men cannot know who God is, men must seek the ethical because it is the highest thing that men can know. However, this does not apply to Abraham, who does not suffer from the epistemological problem. The same God who promised Abraham a son by two people who are past child-bearing (Genesis 17:17-19) brought it about (Gen. 21:1-2) and then commanded him to sacrifice (Genesis 22:2). Abraham knew this was God speaking to him. Kierkegaard is arguing that God must be subject in what he commands by ethics that he has created. This makes sense from a humanistic standpoint, but logically it is awkward. Did God restrict himself when he gave men moral sensibilities?

This is not exactly a defense of Euthyphro. I have argued from the position that Socrates forced Euthyphro into accepting. I believe that it is a logically viable position if it assumed that God does indeed exist, and its foundation is in God. People disagree about who God is and what God finds to be good or holy, but this does not affect the theory proposed in this paper, it does however make it hard to follow practically. However, a problem in epistemology does not imply that the theory itself is false.

Friday, November 14, 2008

Can God Lie?

Can God lie? I think He can, but does not indulge this potential appetite because it does not give God the most glory and allow God to maximally enjoy Himself forever. But, I have been challenged to formally reconcile Hebrews 6:18 to my idea and I take up this challenge in the hope that God would fill me with his Spirit to give me discernment and joy in how I view and love His Word and that I would be willing and able to change my mind without issue if I am shown to be incorrect in my analysis of this verse. If anyone reads this post, directed or not, it does not reflect any part of Paul's theology and should not be attributed as such. Also, if you feel lead to, please feel free to delete this at your discretion Paul and I would also love your ideas and critisism as well. Soli Deo Gloria.

[post-script addendum] - this post is a response to Justin Day's question on manspeak blog: “Kelfer, you state that you think it is possible for God to lie, but Hebrews 6:18, at least in the English translations, tells us that it’s impossible for God to lie. Now it might be the case that the Greek text would give us a different insight on this issue, but the closest translation we have available [NASB] uses the word impossible. Given Hebrews 6, how do you hold your position?”" I agree, this is a bit like picking straws, but I have run into this on multiple occasions and I want to hear some criticism. Please read this with the understanding that this is addressing a very specific question that is being asked so this potential answer is very specific as well.[/post-script addendum]


"13 For when God made a promise to Abraham, since he had no one greater by whom to swear, he swore by himself, 14 saying, “Surely I will bless you and multiply you.” 15 And thus Abraham, [2] having patiently waited, obtained the promise. 16 For people swear by something greater than themselves, and in all their disputes an oath is final for confirmation. 17 So when God desired to show more convincingly to the heirs of the promise the unchangeable character of his purpose, he guaranteed it with an oath, 18 so that by two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have fled for refuge might have strong encouragement to hold fast to the hope set before us. 19 We have this as a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul, a hope that enters into the inner place behind the curtain, 20 where Jesus has gone as a forerunner on our behalf, having become a high priest forever after the order of Melchizedek." (Hebrews 13-20 ESV.org)

The word in Hebrews 6:18 is adynaton which means: "without ability." Its grammatical identity is in an adjective in the nominative singular neuter construct. The purpose for such a usage in this instance is due to a literary device of exaggeration of impossibility which is common in Greek and is also found elsewhere in the New Testament. Its translated meaning is: impotent, weak, or impossible. All three are used commonly throughout scripture in accordance to whatever is theologically convenient and expedient at the time. This word is much like the word peira which is used interchangeably to mean both to test and to tempt and tends to give theologians and translators alike a difficult time.

In this instance, the author of Hebrews is using the concept of swearing by something larger than himself (which the text concerning this relating to Genesis is actually cited here concerning God's covenant with Abraham where he swears by Himself) and falls into the literary category of intentional rhetorical exaggeration. The author's intention is to state in this passage (6:17-18) that God’s purpose will not be changed by anything outside of himself and answers an objection to this mid-statement by stating (forcefully, with the aforementioned literary device) that God does not lie so what he says is true. This is to say that God truthful as shown through and by His revealed character and is worthy of all hope. The author righteously exaggerates (in this case that is to speak in the superlative degree) in this passage to show God’s worthiness of one’s hope and the security therein. Hebrews 6:18 does not say that it is “impossible” for God to lie. If one wants to take the impossible route, it is based off of a literary device of exaggeration and when one places other translations of the same word in scripture in this context as well, it is very difficult to hold that translation of the verse. For instance, this passage equally could also say that it is impotent or weak for God to lie which is also theologically expedient and true if taken exactly (which would better explain why he does not lie). To play on a philosophical playground (if the reader is more comfortable there), a logical argument could be constructed as such:

  1. All things are possible for God.
  2. Some things are impossible for God
  3. Because all things are possible for God, there can be nothing that is impossible for God. This is a contradiction.
  4. Therefore, all impossible things are possible for God.
The main thing to take away from this passage is to know that God does not lie, to trust God, and that God is worthy of that trust.

The only other passage in scripture concerning this issues that have I found is in Titus 1:2 where Paul says that God never lies (or cannot lie [NASB]). This translation is based off the Greek verb “to lie” (pseudomai – (v -inf) to speak falsely) combined with the negative participle (a…) with the word here being constructed as an adjective in the nominative singular masculine construct (apseudes). This means literally that God is without falsehood in speaking [1]. The addition of the nuanced “cannot” and “never” is liberty that was taken in translating so that the passage would be more readable. This passage in Titus states Paul’s intention of why he is writing this Epistle to Titus and goes through all sorts of things that God has promised and revealed and supports its truth by stating that God is without falsehood (aka God does not lie). In such a way, this subordinate clause is purposed to state that a creature’s secure relationship between himself and God (held secure by God’s perfect immutability) is immune to deceit because God is without falsehood and so God’s promises are true and therefore secure and worthy of trust. One great thing this passage does is extend God’s truthfulness to all of God’s dealings with himself and creatures (how sweet this truth is!!), but it does not at all exclude the ability of God to lie, it merely states that God does not do so.

In conclusion, here are my thoughts: Can God lie? Yes. Does God lie? No. Will God ever lie? No. Why does God not lie? Because it is not the best means to accomplish the best end with the greatest of eternal expedience. Lying neither maximizes God's glory nor His enjoyment of Himself so he does not partake in such.

[1] The theological and anthropological implications of God’s speech lacking falsehood are simply enormous. If taken that divine speech is a creative metaphor and that false is the antithesis of true (true (adj.) – a property of a noun being an accurate description of reality), then God creates that which is true. From this concept, all of our beloved “rules” gain relevance and mutual exclusivity gains its bite. The very course of human logic and scientific inquiry exists and experience becomes useful upon God.